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Originally Posted November 3, 2020
by Robert Baty

Link to N.C. Rule 4

https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/PDF/BySection/Chapter_1A/GS_1A-1,_Rule_4.pdf

Relevant Excerpt From Rule 4(j2)(2)

Registered or Certified Mail, Signature Confirmation, or Designated
Delivery Service.
Before judgment by default may be had on service by registered or certified mail, signature confirmation, or by a designateddelivery service authorized pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2) with delivery receipt, the serving party shall file an affidavit with the court showing proof of such service …
This affidavit together with the return receipt, copy of the proof of delivery provided by the United States Postal Service, or delivery receipt, signed by the person who received the mail or delivery if not the addressee raises a presumption that the person who received the mail or delivery and signed the receipt was an agent of the addressee authorized by appointment or by law to be served or to accept service of process or was a person of suitable age and discretion residing in the addressee’s dwelling house or usual place of abode.

Link to Anonymously Written Answers in Reason Article

https://www.answers-in-reason.com/guest-article-series/nonsequitur-court-proceedings/the-brief-the-nonsequitur-court-proceedings-part-1/

Relevant Excerpt From the Answers in Reason Article

Upon receiving the return receipt and filing that with the court (ECF 7), the
Presumption of Service is raised according to Rule 4(j2)(2):
“… with delivery receipt, the serving party shall file an
affidavit with the court showing proof of such service
in accordance with the requirements … delivery
receipt, signed by the person who received the mail
or delivery if not the addressee raises a presumption
that the person who received the mail or delivery and
signed the receipt was an agent of the addressee …”.

Graphic From Website Illustrating The Above

Robert Baty’s Proposal

The Answers in Reason article misrepresents what is presumed under N.C. Rule 4(j2)(2) by leaving the impression that the presumption is only that the person signing for the summons is an agent of the addressee.

In reality, the presumption is that the person is either an agent of the addressee or someone living with the addressee.

The following illustration presents the position recently espoused by Answers in Reason, which I deny, and my position.

I recently had an extended exchange on FaceBook with someone representing Answers in Reason regarding the matter and suggested an edit to the article would be appropriate in order eliminate the misrepresentation.

To date, no edit has been made and the impression left from the exchange is that no edit will be made.

Link to FaceBook Thread Where Exchange Took Place

https://www.facebook.com/answersinreason/posts/2050419141758596

Link to “About” Answers in Reason

https://www.answers-in-reason.com/about/

(excerpts)

We’d like to thank all of you who read, share, and comment on our posts.
Special thanks to our contributors and editors:
And also to those who have helped improve our posts and articles in the editorial sense
such as Matthew Wilson and Andy Nickols.

Update November 9, 2020

Looks like the Answers in Reason people have identified their own problem when it comes to N.C. Rule 4(j2)(2); though they likely won’t admit to it.

Update November 11, 2020

This reference shows that the North Carolina Appeals Court, as I do, recognizes a distinction between the agents referenced in Rule 4(j2)(2) and those with whom a person lives.

https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4658157/patton-v-vogela/

 


 


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