	Case 2:19-cv-02073-JGB-JC Document 12	Filed 07/10/19 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:553
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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	SUSAN SPELL,	Case No. CV 19-2073 JGB(JC)
12		
13	v. { §	ORDER VACATING HEARING ON, SUBMITTING, AND DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE
14	HON. NATALIE STONE, $\begin{cases} \tilde{N} \\ I \end{cases}$	MOTION TO SET ASIDE
15	Respondent.	DOCKET NO. 7]
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On March 20, 2019, petitioner Susan Spell, who is proceeding *pro se*, filed a "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with attachments ("Petition"), purporting to challenge a 2016 juvenile dependency court order issued under California law in Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. DK02119 ("State Case"). On June 14, 2019, the Court summarily dismissed the Petition without prejudice for lack of habeas jurisdiction and entered judgment accordingly.

On June 21, 2019, petitioner filed a "Motion to Set Aside Judgement" ("Motion") with a supporting memorandum ("Memo") and declaration (" Decl."). For the reasons explained below, the Motion is denied.

Petitioner requests that the Court reconsider and set aside the judgment entered in this case, alleging, *inter alia*, that: (1) she meets the "in custody"

requirement for jurisdiction because her children are "illegally" in the custody of their supposed father as a result of the order in the State Case; and (2) there is "sufficient state action to bring these cases within the civil rights statutes" (*i.e.*, 4 "county employees acting under color of state law maliciously used perjured 5 testimony, fabricated evidence and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to warrantlessly take illegal custody [of petitioner's children]," denying her children 6 and her "fundamental constitutional liberty interests"). (Memo at 4-5, 7; Decl. at 7 ¶¶ 2, 5-10). Petitioner further alleges that she has "low-income status" and has 8 9 requested that the Court appoint her counsel. (Memo at 10; Decl. at 11).

First, petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel is denied. There is 10 no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil case. See Storseth v. 11 Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), 12 the Court has discretionary power to request an attorney to represent a party 13 unable to afford counsel. If petitioner is seeking an order for an attorney to 14 represent her without compensation, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) does not authorize 15 federal courts to make coercive appointments of counsel. See Mallard v. U.S. 16 Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); United States v. 17 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986). Given that the Court has 18 19 found it lacks habeas jurisdiction to consider this case and petitioner's ability to articulate her claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved, 20 21 the Court finds no exceptional circumstances merit requesting counsel for petitioner. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) 22 (discussing standard for requesting counsel under section 1915(e), formerly 23 24 section 1915(d)).

25 Second, petitioner's request that the Court reconsider and set aside the judgment entered in this case is also denied. Reconsideration is an "extraordinary 26 remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 27 resources." Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 28

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2000) (citation omitted) (discussing reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
Where, like here, the Court's ruling has resulted in a final judgment, a motion for
reconsideration may be based either on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
("Rule 59(e)") or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ("Rule 60(b)"). The
difference between motions brought under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) is largely
one of timing rather than substance.

7 Pursuant to Rule 59(e), a party may move to alter or amend a judgment within twenty-eight days after entry of the challenged judgment. Allstate 8 9 Insurance Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). District courts have "considerable discretion" when ruling on a motion 10 under Rule 59(e). See Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 11 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Absent "highly unusual 12 circumstances" not present in this case, relief under Rule 59(e) is available only 13 for: (1) a court's clear error of law or fact; (2) "newly discovered or previously 14 unavailable evidence"; (3) a "manifestly unjust" decision; or (4) "an intervening 15 change in the controlling law." Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482, 491-92 (9th 16 Cir. 2016) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2213 (2017); McDowell v. 17 Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (en banc) (citations 18 19 omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1082 (2000).

20 Rule 60(b) permits courts to grant relief from a final judgment or order, and 21 reopen a case, in certain limited circumstances (*i.e.*, when there is (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, 22 23 with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered before the court's 24 decision; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by the opposing party; 25 (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the judgment; and (6) "any other reason that justifies relief."). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 26 U.S. 524, 528 (2005); Hall v. Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 984 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2017). 27 Although worded broadly, Rule 60(b)(6) is a "catchall category" available only in 28

"extraordinary circumstances" which "will rarely occur in the habeas context." 1 2 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 772 (2017)(citation omitted); Hall, 861 F.3d at 987 3 (Rule 60(b)(6) "should be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.") (citation omitted); see generally Martella v. Marine Cooks & 4 Stewards Union, Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, 448 5 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 6 litigant must "establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances which 7 8 prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute [his case]") (citations omitted), 9 cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972). District Courts have "wide discretion" when ruling on Rule 60(b) motions generally. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 777 (citation omitted). 10

11 Here, petitioner has failed to show any basis for relief from the judgment entered in this case. Assuming, arguendo, the truth of petitioner's allegations in 12 the Motion, she still has not alleged a basis to confer habeas jurisdiction on this 13 Court. As explained in the Court's order summarily dismissing the Petition, the 14 Supreme Court decision in Lehman forecloses any argument that petitioner or her 15 children are "in custody" so as to confer habeas jurisdiction with this Court. See 16 Lehman v. Lycoming Cty. Childrens Servs. Agy., 458 U.S. 502, 511 (1982) 17 18 (children who had been placed in foster homes pursuant to state court order were 19 not in the "custody" of the State as that term is used to determine availability of the writ of habeas corpus – "federal habeas has never been available to challenge 20 parental rights or child custody"; "The 'custody' of foster or adoptive parents over 21 22 a child is not the type of custody that traditionally has been challenged through 23 federal habeas. Ms. Lehman simply seeks to relitigate, through federal habeas, not 24 any liberty interest of her sons, but the interest in her own parental rights.") (footnotes omitted). 25

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If petitioner wishes to pursue a civil rights claim against the state actors about whom she complains, she must file a civil rights complaint.<sup>1</sup> Although a district court, after notifying and obtaining informed consent from a petitioner, may construe a habeas petition to plead a civil rights claim if the petition is amenable to conversion on its face, <u>see Nettles v. Grounds</u>, 830 F.3d 922, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), <u>cert. denied</u>, 137 S. Ct. 645 (2017), the Court will not do so here. Civil rights actions are subject to different requirements than federal habeas proceedings. The filing fee for civil rights actions is at least \$350 rather than the \$5 habeas filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). It is not in the interest of

<sup>1</sup>Before doing so, petitioner may wish to avail herself of one of the Federal "Pro Se" Clinics in this district in Los Angeles, Riverside, and Santa Ana. The Clinics offer on-site information and guidance to individuals who are representing themselves (proceeding pro se) in federal civil actions. The Clinics are administered by non-profit organizations, not by the Court.

The Clinic in Los Angeles is located in the Edward Roybal R. Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Suite 170, Terrace Level, Los Angeles, CA 90012.

The Los Angeles Clinic is open **by appointment only** on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, 9:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. One may schedule a telephonic or inperson appointment by calling the Clinic (213-385-2977, ext. 270) or using an internet portal (http://prose.cacd.uscourts.gov/los-angeles) through which one may also submit requests/ questions.

The Clinic in Riverside is located in the George E. Brown Federal Building, 3420 Twelfth Street, Room 125, Riverside, CA 92501. The Riverside Clinic hours are Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m. The Riverside Clinic generally sees visitors on a first come, first served basis.

The Clinic in Santa Ana is located in the Ronald Reagan Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 411 W. 4th Street, Room 1055, Santa Ana, CA 92701. The Santa Ana Clinic hours are Tuesday, 1:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., and Thursday, 10:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. – 3:30 p.m. All visitors to the Santa Ana Clinic must make an appointment by calling (714) 541-1010 (x222).

Much useful information is also available on the Clinic website which is accessible at http://court.cacd.uscourts.gov/cacd/ProSe.nsf/.

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1	judicial economy to convert the Petition into a federal civil rights complaint	
2	because the case would, at a minimum, require additional court resources to deal	
3	with the problems created by the different filing fees, the absence of information	
4	called for by the civil rights complaint form utilized in this district ( <i>e.g.</i> , whether	
5	those sued are sued in an individual or official capacity), and the potential service	
6	issues relative to individuals whose conduct is alleged to have deprived petitioner	
7	of her constitutional rights.	
8	IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion is denied.	

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion is denied. IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2019

HONGRABLE JESUS G. BERNAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presented by:

 17 Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian United States Magistrate Judge